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STATE LAW VERSUS A FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF TORTS
IRVIN M. GOTTLIEB*
The Statute, Its Scope and Basic Standard
Section 421 (k) of the Federal Tort Claims Act excludes from its
coverage "any claim arising in a foreign country."' The Foreign
Claims Act2 which was passed by the 77th Congress and amended by
the 78th Congress has specific application to foreign countries, includ-
ing places located therein which are under the temporary or perma-
nent jurisdiction of the United States.
Court test of the territorial scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act
arose in a series of cases decided in 1948,3 culminating in United
States v. Spelar,4 where the issue of possible foreign coverage was
definitely ruled out. -As a result of the foregoing cases, conflict of
laws problems involving the domestic law of foreign nations do not
arise in the administration of the statute. Of course, Alaska, the
Canal Zone, the Virgin Islands, Territory of Hawaii, Puerto Rico,
Guam and all island possessions of the United States fall within the
coverage of the statute.
* Attorney, Civil Division, Department of Justice. The views expressed
in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the posi-
tion or viewpoint of the Department of Justice.
1. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(k) (1950). Some of the earlier bills carried the above
exception modified by the words "in behalf of an alien." See, e.g., H.R. 5299,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(12) (1941); H.R. 7236, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. §
303(12) (1939); S. 2690, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(12) (1939). At the sug-
gestion of the Department of Justice the words "in behalf of an alien" were
deleted from all subsequent legislative drafts. Hearings before Committee
on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, 30, 35,
43,61 (1942).
2. 55 STAT. 880 (1942), as amended, 61 STAT. 501 (1947), 31 U.S.C.A. § 224(d)
(Supp. 1953).
3. Brewer v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Cal. 1948) (Okinawa,
under American military occupation); Lenhardt v. United States, S.D. Cal.,
June 22, 1948 (American occupied zone of Germany); Denahey v. Isbrandtsen
Co., 80 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (Japan); Brunell v. United States, 77 F.
Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (Saipan under military occupation); Straneri v.
United States, 77 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (Port of Ghent, Belgium under
military control of American forces).
4. 338 U.S. 217, 221, 70 Sup. Ct. 10, 94 L. Ed. 3 (1949). The Spelar case
involved a flight engineer by the name of Mark Spelar, an employee of
American Overseas Airlines who was killed in a take-off crash at Harmon
Field, Newfoundland, one of the air bases leased for 99 years by Great Britain
to the United States. Spelar's administratrix brought suit against the United
States in the district of her residence, the Eastern District of New York.
Negligent operation of the air field was alleged. The law relied upon was the
Newfoundland Wrongful Death Statute. Newfoundland Consol. Stat., 3d
Series, c. 213.
5. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (b) (1950) (express mention is made of the district
courts for Alaska, the Canal Zone and the Virgin Islands). The language of
Section 410 (a) of The Federal Tort Claims Act gives exclusive jurisdiction
206
FEDERAL COMMON LAW
The law applicable to suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act is
that of the place where the act or omission occurred. Accordingly,
the Act provides for jurisdiction of the district courts of the United
States over "civil actions on claims against the United States, for
money damages .. for injury or loss of property, or personal injury
or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."6 It is thus
apparent that the statute embodies the basic principle in Anglo-Amer-
ican law of Torts that liability-creating conduct shall be measured
by the lex loci delicti.7 Applying this criterion, it has been held that
the substantive tort law of the state determines the existence of a
cause of action against the sovereign. 8
Because of the recurrent nature of such issue, the main thrust of
the ensuing discussion will deal with a series of variant situations in
which the focal problem relates to the application of state or federal
law in fields where the former might, upon superficial considerations,
seem applicable.
Parenthetically, it may be observed that the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals in the Burkhardt9 case, reversing the District Court,
disregarded the time limitation of the Maryland law for the bring-
ing of wrongful death actions by and against private individuals,
holding that the federal law, prescribed its own time limitation which
should govern, once a cognizable cause of action was stated. This
ruling was then open to criticism as giving to an individual a greater
to the United States District Court wherein the plaintiff resides or where the
act or omission complained of occurred, including the United States District
Courts for the territories and possessions of the United States. 60 STAT. 843,
844 (1946). This section is now codified. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b)
(1950).
6. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (1950). "The liability of the United States will
be the same as a private person under like circumstances, in accordance with
the local law, except that no punitive damages and no interest prior to judg-
ment may be recovered." Sm. REP. NO. 1400, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1946).
See also Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 553 (1947). See Wells v. Simonds Abra-
sive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 520, 73 Sup. Ct. 856, 97 L. Ed. 1211 (1953) (dissenting
opinion).
7. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 34 Sup. Ct. 955,
58 L. Ed. 1457 (1914); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.
347, 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 53 L. Ed. 826 (1909); Slater v. Mexican Nat. R.R., 194
U.S. 120 126, 24 Sup. Ct. 581, 48 L. Ed. 900 (1904); Loucks v. Standard Oil
Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918) (opinion by Cardozo); 1 BEALE, CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 378.2 (1934); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-79 (1934);
see Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., supra note 6, at 520 (dissenting opinion).
8. Young v. United States, 184 F.2d 587, 21 A.L.R.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
Maryland, to the use of Burkhardt v. United States, 165 F.2d 869 (4th Cir.
1947).
9. Maryland, to the use of Burkhardt v. United States, 165 F.2d 869 (4th
Cir. 1947), reversing 70 F. Supp. 982 (D. Md. 1947).
1954]
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right against the United States than against another private individual
under state law, especially in those thirteen states, including Mary-
land, where the time limit was regarded as an integral part of the
right as distinguished from the remedy'
The problem (as to limitations on actions for death, personal injury
or property damage) was, in any event, resolved by legislation which
applies a now uniform two-year limitation from the date of accrual
of the cause of action to eliminate the conflict of varying state stat-
utes of limitation."
Implicit in the treatment of local law as the measure of substantive
liability in tort is the historic principle that such cause of action is
transitory,12 and ordinarily may be brought against the wrongdoer
wherever he may be found, assuming jurisdiction in the forum over
the subject matter and over the parties.18 This general principle has
10. Cf. Maryland, for Use of Dunnigan v. Colburn, 171 Md. 23, 187 Atl. 881,
107 A.L.R. 1045 (1936) (A.L.R. annotation lists states). See Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Burnette, 239 U.S. 199, 201, 36 Sup. Ct. 75, 60 L. Ed. 226 (1015);
Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454, 24 Sup. Ct. 692, 48 L. Ed. 1067 (1904); The
Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 7 Sup. Ct. 140, 30 L. Ed. 358 (1886); Lewis v. RFC,
177 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1949); 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 7205
(3d ed., Horack, 1943).
11. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401(b) (1950). For application of the two-year period
to personal injury actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act, see Levitch v.
United States, 114 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Mo. 1953); Whalen v. United States,
107 F. Supp. 112 (E.D. Pa. 1952); Sweet v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 863
(S.D. Cal. 1947). As to diversity of citizenship actions not under the Federal
Tort Claims Act or not under other federal laws having their own express
limitations, this conflicts problem presently may be resolved by the law of
the forum (where the forum has its own express limitation differing from
that of the lex loci delicti), as being consonant with the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 73
Sup. Ct. 856, 97 L. Ed. 1211 (1953). The dissent, however, is substantial and
well-reasoned. Id. at 519 et seq. In non-diversity cases, under the maritime
law, where death results from a maritime tort committed on navigable waters
within a state (e.g., Kentucky) whose statutes give a one-year right of action
on account of wrongful death, a federal court sitting within such state may
extend the time limitation of the local law which it is applying when the
point of departure may be characterized as a "mere procedural nicety" as
to which it need not achieve uniformity with local "elegantia juris." Levinson
v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 73 Sup. Ct. 914, 97 L. Ed. 1319 (1953); cf. Mejia v.
United States, 152 F.2d 686, 688 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 862
(1946).
12. McKenna v. Fisk, 1 How. 241, 11 L. Ed. 117 (U.S. 1843); Rafael v.
Verelst, 2 Black W. 983, 96 Eng. Rep. 579 (K.B. 1775); Mostyn v. Fabrigas,
1 Cowp. 161, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1774); 3 STREET, FOUNDATioNS OF LEGAL
LiABnLTY 91-92 (1906) (doctrine well-established by 14th century). Date of
accrual has been construed in Carnes v. United States, 186 F.2d 648 (10th Cir.
1951), and in Oahu Ry. and Land Co. v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 707 (D.
Hawaii 1947).
13. Slater v. Mexican National R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126, 24 Sup. Ct. 581, 48
L. Ed. 900 (1904); Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 112, 18 Sup.
Ct. 526, 42 L. Ed. 964 (1898) (suit by a resident of New Jersey in federal
court in New York against a foreign corporation doing business in New York
for a personal tort committed in Ireland); Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Cox, 145
U.S. 593, 604, 605, 12 Sup. Ct. 905, 36 L. Ed. 829 (1892) (suit in federal court
in Texas for damages for wrongful death of plaintiff's husband in Louisiana
under death statute of latter state); Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11, 26
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been subject to much attrition over the years, especially where the
particular type of litigation conflicted with the public policy of the
forum, the doctrine of forum non conveniens being but one of the
better known examples of effective check upon the unrestrained ex-
ercise of the plaintiff's choice of the forum in the interest of avoiding
so-called "tramp litigation."' 4
Suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act also carry a geographic
limitation on the transitory nature of tort suits insofar as the sov-
ereign is concerned and may only be prosecuted in the judicial dis-
trict in which the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission
complained of occurred.'5 This provision, formerly a part of Section
410 (a) of the original statute 6 was placed under Chapter 87 of the
Judicial Code, which chapter deals with venue in the district courts.
Since many of the actions against the United States under the Tort
Act involve multiple plaintiffs, frequently residing in different parts
of the country, there appears to be little doubt, despite the restrictive
language of Section 1402 (b), that on motion of defendant the courts
may transfer such suits pursuant to Section 1404(a)1 7 of the Judicial
Code to either of the two forums allowing prosecution of the action,
since the "place of suit" provision of the law, by analagous statutory
construction, apparently relates to venue, not jurisdiction.18
L. Ed. 439 (1880) (suit in federal court in New York on diversity grounds
for damages under New York wrongful death act by plaintiff, a New York
appointed administratrix, against defendant, a New Jersey corporation, for
injuries and death of plaintiff's intestate occurring in New Jersey). See
Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 272, 273, 56 Sup. Ct. 229,
80 L. Ed. 220 (1935).
14. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 69 Sup. Ct. 944, 93 L. Ed. 1207 (1949)
(forum non conveniens held to apply to FELA actions by virtue of § 1404(a)
of the Judicial Code). Legal writers have dealt copiously with the history
and application of the doctrine. Id. at 68 n.28.
15. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1402(b) (1950).
16. 60 STAT. 843 (1946).
17. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (1950).
18. In Hoiness v. United States, 335 U.S. 297, 301-02, 69 Sup. Ct. 78, 93 L.
Ed. 16 (1948), involving an action against the United States under the Suits
in Admiralty Act, 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 741 et seq. (1944), the
Court, construed Section 2 of the Act as relating to venue, not jurisdiction, and
held that the right to object to improper venue was waived by defendant by
failing to object before pleading to the merits. The place of suit proviso of
the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1402 (a) (1950), providing for suit against the
United States in the district courts in matters of contract has also been con-
strued as relating to venue, which may be waived in the absence of objection
before pleading to the merits. United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1, 11-12,
35 Sup. Ct. 459, 59 L. Ed. 813 (1915); Thames and Mersey Marine Ins. Co.,
Ltd. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19, 24, 35 Sup. Ct. 496, 59 L. Ed. 821 (1915).
The Hoiness case further points out that the place of suit provisions of the
Jones Act, 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (1944), has also been con-
strued as relating to venue. See Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 384-
85, 44 Sup. Ct. 391, 68 L. Ed. 748 (1924). See also Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v.
United States, 324 U.S. 215, 224, 65 Sup. Ct. 639, 89 L. Ed. 901 (1945) (Public
Vessels Act). The legislative history of Section 1402 of the Judicial Code
also supports this construction. "Section consolidates the venue provisions
of section 762 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., with the venue provisions of section
19541
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Adverting further to the state law to be applied in cases arising
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the determination of what con-
stitutes substantive as distinguished from procedural law under Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins' 9 in diversity cases has raised a host of vexatious
problems as numerous and ill-defined as the sprites which escaped
from Pandora's Box. Although it is not possible within the limits of
this paper to explore such a broad field of the law, a caveat is neces-
sary at this point. These concepts frequently differ according to the
conflicts rule of the state in which the federal court is sitting2° and
are only somewhat unified as to procedural aspect by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.2' These problems, arising in diversity cases,
do not affect the United States as a statutory defendant,22 except pos-
sibly as to joinder of other defendant tortfeasors. Section 411 of the
original Tort Claims Act 23 makes the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure applicable to suits against the United States.24 Section 411 was not
embodied in the new Judicial Code since Rule 1 of the Federal Rules
amply covers this point.25 Liberal construction as to the right of suit
is indicated in United States v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.,2 0 where the
Supreme Court cites with approval the statement of Judge Cardozo
in Anderson v. John L. Hayes Construction Co.:
931 (a) of such title, the latter provisions relating to tort claims cases. The
jurisdictional provisions of such section 931 (a) are incorporated in section
1346(b) of this title." H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A131 (1947).
See also United States v. Acord, Civil No. 4694, 10th Cir., January 14, 1954.
19. 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
20. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 Sup. Ct. 1020,
85 L. Ed. 1477 (1941).
21. Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal Rules,
3 VA~m. L. REv. 711 (1950); see Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514,
519, 73 Sup. Ct. 856, 97 L. Ed. 1211 (1953) (dissenting opinion). For a general
treatment on distinctions between substance and procedure under the rules,
see Clark, The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules, 1 F.R.D. 417 (1940),
24 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 158 (1941); Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the
Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933); Morgan, Choice of Law Governing
Proof, 58 HARV. L. REv. 153, 195 (1944).
For the difficulty in distinguishing substance and procedure, see, e.g., Ragan
v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 69 Sup. Ct. 1233, 93
L. Ed. 1520 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 69 Sup. Ct.
1235, 93 L. Ed. 1524 (1949); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 69 Sup. Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed. 1528 (1949); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99, 65 Sup. Ct. 1464, 89 L. Ed. 2079 (1945).
22. See note 52 infra; Thomsen, "The Law of the Place" Provisions of the
Act, 33 A.B.A.J. 959 (1947) (federal courts under the Act are not bound by
diversity rules and may on their own conflict rules determine whether a
particular question is one of substance or procedure). See also Field v.
United States, 107 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ill. 1952); Bach v. United States, 92 F.
Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
23. 60 STAT. 843 (1946).
24. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6, 73 Sup. Ct. 528, 97 L. Ed. 727
(1953); United States v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 372, 380, 70
Sup. Ct. 207, 94 L. Ed. 171 (1949).
25. See H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A204 (1947).
26. 338 U.S. 366, 70 Sup. Ct. 207, 94 L. Ed. 171 (1949).
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"The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough7
where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by
refinement of construction, where consent has been announced. '27
Since the main current of the ensuing discussion herein pertains
to the application of state or federal law to given situations, rather
than to a choice of applicable state law, such treatment does not in
strict nomenclature fall within the classic definition of conflict of
laws28 although the close kinship will probably permit such generic
coverage. The relationship becomes all the more apparent when it is
noted that insofar as the prosecution of any claim under the Federal
Tort Claims Act is concerned, local law applies not only to the merits
thereof, but also to the defenses of contributory negligence, willful
misconduct, aggravation of damages, and the distribution or disposi-
tion of the judgment in cases of death.2 9
EmpZoyee of the Government
Section 2671 of the Judicial Code contains a definition of "Employee
of the government" for purposes of the Act.30 In dealing with em-
ployees of the Government, certain statutory provisions are encoun-
tered at the threshold. Every person elected or appointed to the
27. 243 N.Y. 140, 153 N.E. 28, 29-30 (1926).
28. The Restatement defines the field as covering that part of the law of
each state which determines whether in dealing with a legal situation the
law of some other state will be recognized, be given effect or applies. RE-
STATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1(2) (1934). Section 2 of the Restatement
defines a state as a territorial unit in which the general body of law is sep-
arate and distinct from the law of any other territorial unit. Comment c,
under Section 2 of the Restatement, points out that although the United
States is not a state in the legal sense, because each state of the Union, Terri-
tory and the District of Columbia has its own law and the legislation of
Congress is a portion of the law of each state, nevertheless, the sovereign is
a state in the political sense.
29. The coverage of local law was expressly enunciated in recommending
the deletion of certain sections of the bills being considered before the House
Judiciary Committee. Hearings before Judiciary Committee on H.R. 5373
and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 30, 61 (1942) (Q 204, payment of death
award to survivor; § 302, defense of contributory negligence; § 304, aggrava-
tion of damages due to claimant's unreasonable neglect; § 308, payment of
claim to survivors). See Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 522,
73 Sup. Ct. 856, 97 L. Ed. 1211 (1953) (dissenting opinion; designation of
"substantive matters"). See also Porto Rico Gas & Coke Co. v. Frank Rullar
& Assoc., 189 F.2d 397, 404 (1st Cir. 1951) (Puerto Rican rule as to affirmative
defense held to be substantive and determinative since Puerto Rico was place
of tort).
30. This section, in pertinent part, reads as follows: "'Employee of the
government' includes officers or employees of any federal agency, members
of the military or naval forces of the United States, and persons acting on
behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or permanently
in the service of the United States, whether with or without compensation.
'Acting within the scope of his office or employment', in the case of a
member of the military or naval forces of the United States, means acting in
line of duty." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671 (1950).
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civil or military or naval service of the United States (excepting the
President) must take the prescribed oath of office.8 1
Members of the federal judiciary and employees of the federal
courts, who must also take an oath of office, are members of the
independent judiciary and are not employees of the Government for
purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act.32 Members of the National
Guard of the several states may not be considered employees of the
Government under the mentioned section unless called into the active
service of the United States in time of war. 3 As to unit caretakers
in the state National Guard, there is a conflict of holdings, the better
reasoned cases holding such individual, though charged with the
custody of federal property loaned to the Guard units, are not em-
ployees of the United States.3 4 The rationale supporting the conclu-
sion that such persons are not employees of the Government is that
their caretaker function, an integral part of their service in the state
Guard units, is essentially and primarily for the benefit of the state
Guard units and any benefit to the United States is secondary, inciden-
tal and remote.35 Reasoning by analogy, it could hardly be contended
31. REv. STAT. §§ 1756-57 (1875), 5 U.S.C.A. § 16 (1927). In addition the
employee must within 30 days of his appointment file an affidavit that he has
not given any consideration for his appointment. 44 STAT. 918, as amended,
5 U.S.C.A. § 21(a) (Cum. Supp. 1950). These papers must be filed with the
agency to which the office pertains. REV. STAT. § 1759 (1875), 5 U.S.C.A. § 21
(1927). No salary may be paid until the affidavit is filed. 44 STAT. 919, 5
U.S.C.A. § 21(b) (Cum. Supp. 1950). Copies of papers appointing employees
are customarily maintained in the agency personnel office. Settlement of
account of deceased officers or employees is prescribed by statute under the
supervision of the Comptroller General. 64 STAT. 395 (1950), 5 U.S.C.A.
§§ 61(f) et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1950).
32. E.g., Cromelin v. United States, 177 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 944 (1950) (district judge and trustee in bankruptcy not officers
within FTCA).
33. Williams v. United States, 189 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1951); Satcher v.
United States, 101 F. Supp. 919 (W.D.S.C. 1952); Glasgow v. United States,
95 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. Ala. 1951); Nietupski v. United States, Civil No. 2095,
W.D. Wis., May 8, 1950; Mackay v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 696 (D. Conn.
1949). But cf. O'Toole v. United States, 206 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1953) (member
of D.C. Guard held to be an employee of the Government; no "intervening
sovereignty" by state ousts this relationship and leaves only the federal chain
of command).
34. Williams v. United States, 189 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1951); Glasgow v.
United States, 95 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. Ala. 1951); Nietupski v. United States,
Civil No. 2095, W.D. Wis., May 8, 1950. Contra: Elmo v. United States, 197
F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1952); United States v. Duncan, 197 F.2d 233 (5th Cir.
1952); United States v. Holly, 192 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1951). See Rose, The
National Guard and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 6 VAW. L. REV. 370 (1953).
35. The ruling of the Comptroller General, B.-117150, Sept. 28, 1953, cover-
ing civilian employees of the state National Guard units under the old age
benefit provisions of the Social Security Act effects no change in their status
as state employees since this is merely a fiscal arrangement for such payment
by the United States from moneys annually appropriated to the maintenance
of the state Guard units. Such coverage does not import a master-servant
relationship in the law because of the broad coverage of the Social Security
Act. See Ewing v. McLean, 189 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 1951); United States
v. Silk, 155 F.2d 356, 358 (10th Cir. 1946), afd in part, rev'd in part, 331 U.S.
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that a bailee in taking care of the property bailed became the em-
ployee of the bailor. It may also be pointed out that state employees,
engaged in carrying out state or local responsibilities under programs
authorized by federal statute, even where the Federal Government
makes substantial contributions in money or in materials are without
the coverage of Section 2671.86
The legislative history of Section 402 (b) of the basic statute37 which
became Section 2671 of the Judicial Code, also makes clear that it
does not purport to cover any person in the protective services en-
gaged in civilian defense, such as an air raid warden, a fire warden
or any person acting in a similar capacity under supervision of the
Office of Civilian Defense, who is not also an officer or employee of
the Office of Civil Defense, duly appointed as such.88 The mentioned
legislative history related to World War II, but there is little reason
to believe that it would not be construed to cover similar periods of
future emergency or actual hostilities.
Although the Federal Tort Claims Act was only intended to cover
the torts of the executive departments and independent agencies,
including their corporate arms, as defined in Section 2671 of the Judi-
cial Code39 the Comptroller General has interpreted the administra-
tive settlement provisions of the law (empowering administrative
settlement by the agency involved of tort claims up to $1,000) 40 to
permit such settlement by the Library of Congress, which is regarded
as a part of the legislative branch of the Government.41 This ruling
is based upon a liberal construction of "employees of the Govern-
ment," and a subordination of the "federal agency" portion of Section
2671. While such interpretation may well bind the United States
as to the disbursement of its own money as a fiscal matter, since the
Attorney General is the chief law officer of the Government,4 the
position taken in any actual suit against the United States may con-
ceivably be otherwise.
704, 711, 712 (1947); O'Leary v. Social Security Board, 153 F.2d 704, 707 (3d
Cir. 1946).
36. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671 (1950). See Weltha v. United States, Civil No. 1-296,
S.D. Iowa, December 8, 1953 (state employee driving federal vehicle loanedto soil conservation district and performing state functions under federal soil
conservation program); Lavitt v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 149 (D. Conn.
1948) (potato inspector employed by local association of borrowers under
federal potato loan program); cf. Glasgow v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 213,
214 (N.D. Ala. 1951) (in era of subsidies federal assistance does not per se
create a legal master-servant relationship).
37. 60 STAT. 843 (1946).
38. Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35
GEO. L.J. 1, 11, 12 (1946).
39. See Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306 U.S. 381, 390, 59 Sup. Ct. 516, 83 L. Ed.
784 (1939).
40. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2672 (1950).
41. 26 Comp. Dec. 891 (1947).
42. See Booth v. Fletcher, 101 F.2d 676, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied,
307 U.S. 628 (1939).
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The mere assignment, furnishing or loan of a vehicle by the Federal
Government, or even the loan of a federally compensated driver, plus
the vehicle to a state or local government, or instrumentality thereof
for the carrying out of a state or local program (even assuming fed-
eral financial grants-in-aid of such activity) does not make such
person an employee of the United States, although it night well
constitute such employee a "loaned servant" for whose torts the
borrower is liable.43
Even where an individual is paid benefits under the Federal Em-
ployees' Compensation Act,44 such payment may not, however, be
regarded as a legal determination that the recipient was an employee
of the United States, since it is merely an administrative determina-
tion, without provision for court review, 45 binding only on the fiscal
officers of the Government without affecting the legal rights of the
parties.46 The broad coverage of this beneficial statute with its prime
objective of compensating the injured worker completely negates the
legal definition of the master-servant relationship.47 Hence, it is
irrelevant to determine the status of the recipient of compensation
under this statute as an employee of the Government and the deter-
mination may probably be excluded from use in evidence in a legal
proceeding under the Federal Tort Claims Act.4M 8
The foregoing discussion relating to the determination of who is an
employee of the. Government, as distinguished from the related prob-
lem as to whether the employee is acting within the scope of his
employment, invariably raises the following basic inquiries which
must be answered in reaching a legal conclusion:
(1) Who actually hired the person involved in the delict?
(2) What records are available to show employment?
(3) Was such person at the time of the accrual of the claim still an
employee of the Government, or of another?
43. Fries v. United States, 170 F.2d 726, 731 (6th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 954 (1949); Mackay v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 696, 697 (D. Conn.
1949); Cobb v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. La. 1948); cf. Perucki v.
United States, 76 F. Supp. 34 (M.D. Pa. 1948); see Denton v. Yazoo & Miss.
R.R., 284 U.S. 305, 52 Sup. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 310 (1932); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY
§ 227 (1933).
44. 39 STAT. 742 (1916), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 751 et seq. (1927).
45. Dahn v. Davis, 258 U.S. 421, 42 Sup. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 696 (1922);
Dierssen v. Woolever, 3 F.R.D. 342 (D. Conn. 1944).
46. Dawnic Steamship Corp. v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 537, 578, 579 (1940);
Barnett v. United States, 16 Ct. C1. 521; McKnight v. United States, 13 Ct. Cl.
292, aff'd, 98 U.S. 179 (1878).
47. Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d. 11, 17 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 310 U.S. 649 (1940); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Parker, 64 F. Supp.
615 (D. Md. 1946); Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, SEN.
Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1941).
48. See note 35 supra.
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(4) Who has immediate and direct supervision of his activities?
(5) Who has the power to discharge such person?
(6) Who pays him his compensation?
(7) Are deductions made from his pay for retirement purposes by
the United States?
(8) Is .he subject to the Federal Employees' Compensation Act?49
Thus, regardless of the statutory admonition of Section 1346(b) 50
that the liability of the United States is to be determined according
to the standards applicable to a private individual under local law,
the eight factors listed above make necessary recourse to federal law,
federal regulations and federal evidentiary materials for the purpose
of determining the status of the person alleged to be an employee of
the Government. Considerations of state or local law to affect, or
even analogize the status of such person to those privately employed
within the state would obviously be erroneous, confusing and non-
probative. Hence, federal law must govern.51 This conclusion also
points up the interesting fact that Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, notwith-
standing, there is unquestionably emerging a body of federal common
law of torts5 2 which no doubt has been accelerated and augmented
49. 39 STAT. 742 (1916), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 751 et seq. (1927). Except
for a master or member of the crew of any vessel, the federal employee is
precluded from relief under any statute other than the Compensation Act.
58 STAT. 312 (1944), 5 U.S.C.A. § 757(b) (Cum. Supp. 1950). See Johansen v.
United States, 343 U.S. 427, 72 Sup. Ct. 849, 96 L. Ed. 1051 (1952); cf. Sasse
v. United States, 201 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1953). In Underwood v. United
States, 207 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1953), it was held that the exclusionary pro-
visions of the Compensation Act bar recovery by a husband for loss of con-
sortium under FTCA, even though a private individual might be permitted
recovery under Colorado law.
50. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (1950).
51. That there is a federal common law of contracts has been weli-estab-
lished. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308 and n.10, 67 Sup.
Ct. 1604, 91 L. Ed. 2067 (1947). Dealing with the field of contracts, the Court
spoke of the existence of a "federal common law" or a "law of independent
federal judicial decision" outside the constitutional realm, untouched by the
Erie decision. See also National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S.
454, 65 Sup. Ct. 354, 89 L. Ed. 383 (1945); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,
318 U.S. 363, 63 Sup. Ct. 573, 87 L. Ed. 838 (1943).
52. E.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146, 71 Sup. Ct. 153, 95 L. Ed.
152 (1950); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305, 67 Sup. Ct.
1604, 91 L. Ed. 2067 (1947); Stepp v. United States, 207 F.2d 909 (4th Cir.
1953); United States v. Sharpe, 189 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir. 1951); Foltz v.
Moore McCormack Lines, Inc., 189 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 871 (1951); United States v. Eleazer, 177 F.2d 914, 916 (4th Cir. 1949);
Hubsch v. United States, 174 F.2d 7, 9 (5th Cir. 1949); Van Zuch v. United
States, Civil No. 8514, E.D.N.Y., January 20, 1954; Shew v. United States, 116
F. Supp. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1953); Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D.
Va. 1953); Field v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 401, 403 (N.D. Ill. 1952); Wil-
liams v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 208, 209 (N.D. Cal. 1952); Notes, 59
HARTv. L. REv. 966 (1946), 41 ILL. L. REV. 551 (1946). See also 2 SuTmRL-=,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4602 (3d ed., Horack, 1943) (federal common law
of statutory construction).
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by the current of decisions rendered by the federal courts under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.
Scope of Employment
The Federal Tort Claims Act has two definitions of "scope of em-
playment." That pertaining to military personnel appears at Section
2671 and prescribes "acting in line of duty" as the legal criterion to
be applied.P As to civilian employees, the traditional language with-
out modification is found in Section 1346 (b). Far from being words
of art, having settled meaning in the law, this highly indefinite phrase
is but a bare formula to cover the vicarious liability of the master for
those acts of the servant by which the law measures the responsibility
of the former.5 4 What conduct is within the scope of employment in
certain situations frequently differs according to what state law is
applied; however, it is the lex loci delicti which normally determines
whether the particular delict falls within the scope of employment
of the alleged tortfeasor.5 5 As previously stated herein, Section
1346 (b) of the Act is a statutory adoption of this principle.0 Since
the United States is a sovereign body politic, it can only act through
the medium of its duly authorized officers and agents, with such
delegation of authority as may be necessary to effectuate its sovereign
powers and duties.57 Hence, its liability in tort is necessarily vicari-
ous.58 In the field of contract law, the United States has no general
agents empowered to bind it by their acts or statements and any per-
sons purporting to act for it are special agents with limited powers
having foundation in law.59 It is also well established that the United
States can only be bound by persons legally authorized to act in its
behalf and that unauthorized commitments of officers or employees
assuming to act for it cannot bind the sovereign °
53. 28 U.S.C-A. § 2671 (1950).
54. PRossER, TORTS 475-76 (1941); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 228, comment a
(1933).
55. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 387 and comment b (1934). Since
"scope of employment" goes to the very essence of responsibility for any
liability-creating conduct, it is undeniably substantive in nature. Cf. id. §
584 and comment b. See Field v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 401, 405 (N.D.
I1. 1952).
56. See notes 6 and 29 supra.
57. United States v. Tingey, 5 Pet. 115, 8 L. Ed. 66 (U.S. 1831); 40 Ops.
ATT'y GEN. 225 (1942).
58. PROSSER, TORTS 471 (1941).
59. E.g., REV. STAT. § 3679 (1875), as amended, 31 U.S.C.A. § 665 (Supp.
1953); REv. STAT. § 3732 (1875), 41 U.S.C.A. § 11 (1952). These statutes re-
strict the contractual authority of Government agencies to specific statutory
appropriation.
60. Fulmer v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 137, 149 (N.D. Ala. 1949); Wright
v. United States, 86 Ct. Cl. 290, cert. denied, 305 U.S. 609 (1938); cf. Federal
Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 68 Sup. Ct. 1 92 L. Ed. 10 (1947);
Fries v. United States, 170 F.2d 726, 730 (6th Cir. 1948); Felder v. Federal
Crop Ins. Corp., 146 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1944); The Ship Construction & Trading
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These principles in the field of contract law cannot, of course, in
their entirety be imported into the law of torts, where privity has no
necessary relation to the adventitious nature of liability-creating con-
duct-most wilful torts being excluded by Section 2680 (h) 1-but
by permissive analogy they serve to underscore the strict necessity
that the employee of the Government be properly acting within the
scope of his employment to fix liability for his acts under the doctrine
of respondeat superior.0
Criticism of the Government for the advocacy of such strict ap-
plication of the respondeat superior doctrine in automobile cases has
been voiced.63 The necessarily valid defense to such criticism is that
since the Act represents a limited waiver of sovereign immunity from
suit, it must be strictly construed and cannot be extended beyond the
plain language of the statutory authorization.64 Nor does any repre-
sentative of the United States have the power to waive the conditions
or limitations of the statute.6 5
Underlying most of those cases just cited, wherein the Government
avoided liability on the grounds that the employee was not acting
within the scope of his employment is the rationale that the appli-
Co. v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 419, 456 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 699
(1941).
61. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (h) (1950).
62. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 27, 28 n.17, 73 Sup. Ct. 956, 97
L. Ed. 1427 (1953); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 Sup. Ct. 153, 95
L. Ed. 152 (1950); Murphey v. United States, 179 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1950)
United States v. Eleazer, 177 F.2d 914, 918 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 33i
U.S. 903 (1950); United States v. Campbell, 172 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 337 U.S. 957 (1949); Cropper v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 81 (N.D.
Fla. 1948); Long v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 35 (S.D. Cal. 1948); Rutherford
v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Tenn. 1947), affd per curiam, 168
F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1948).
63. Note, 61 YALE L.J. 435 (1952). The Government is a hard bargainer.
Id. at 439. As a result, the Act has failed to realize the congressional purpose
of placing the United States in the same position as a private employer. Id.
at 441. Some states apply a strict interpretation of "scope of employment."
E.g., Collins v. Dollar S.S. Lines, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); Hutchens
v. Covert, 39 Ind. App. 382, 78 N.E. 1061 (1906); La Bella v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 224 Mo. App. 708, 24 S.W.2d 1072 (1930); cf. Rhodes v. United
States, 79 Fed. 740 (8th Cir. 1897) (soldier contracted a disease before
enlistment; was cured and again contracted it while in the service. To be
in line of duty, the court held the service must have been the cause of the
disease, not merely coincident with it in time. The act, to be in line of duty,
must have relation of causation, mediate or immediate to the duty owed
by the actor.).
64. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31, 73 Sup. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427
(1953); United States v. United States F. & G. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 60 Sup. Ct.
653, 84 L. Ed. 894 (1940); United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 60 Sup. Ct.
659, 84 L. Ed. 888 (1940); Munro v. United States, 303 U.S. 36, 41, 58 Sup.
Ct. 421, 82 L. Ed. 633 (1938); United States v. Michel, 282 U.S. 656, 659, 51
Sup. Ct. 284, 75 L. Ed. 598 (1931); Price v. United States and Osage Indians,
174 U.S. 373, 375-76, 19 Sup. Ct. 765, 43 L. Ed. 1011 (1899).
65. Munro v. United States, 303 U.S. 36, 41, 58 Sup. Ct. 421, 82 L. Ed.
633 (1938); Reid v. United States, 211 U.S. 529, 539, 29 Sup. Ct. 171, 53
L. Ed. 313 (1909); Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227, 8 Sup. Ct. 82, 31 L. Ed.
128 (1887); Wallace v. United States, 142 F.2d 240, 242, 243 (2d Cir. 1944).
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cable provisions of federal law or departmental regulations 6 clearly
placed the actions of the employee outside of the scope of his employ-
ment or line of duty, albeit provisions of state law may have dictated
a different result.
The necessity for the aforementioned application of federal, as
distinguished from state law, relating to scope of employment in
suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act is somewhat clarified by dis-
cussion of a few of the cases in which this principle emerges.
In United States v. Sharpe,7 the court in applying federal law to
the fact situation in the case6 8 to determine scope of employment
within the meaning of the statute, reached the conclusion that there
was involved a question of statutory construction as to which the
federal courts were not bound by local decisions but could apply
their own standards.6 9 The court stated:
'We look to the federal law and decisions to determine whether or
not the person who inflicted the injury was an 'employee of the Govern-
ment' * ** 'acting within the scope of his offfice or employment'. We look
to the local law for the purpose of determining whether the act with
which he is charged gives rise to liability. The Tort Claims Act adopts
the local law for the purpose of defining tort liability, not for the purpose
of determining the relationship of the government to its employees."
[italics supplied) 70
The court properly found no tenable basis for distinguishing this case
66. Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Army have the force
and effect of law. Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 62 Sup. Ct.
1168, 86 L. Ed. 1611 (1942); United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291, 302, 10
L. Ed. 968 (1842); Sherman v. United States, Civil No. 52-355, S.D.N.Y., May
19, 1950; United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 21 F. Supp. 645 (S.D. Cal.
1937), af'd, 107 F.2d 402, 410 (9th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 654 (1940);
Cassarello v. United States, 271 Fed. 486 (M.D. Pa. 1919), aff'd, 279 Fed. 396
(3d Cir. 1922).
67. 189 F.2d 239, 341 (4th Cir. 1951).
68. Sgt. Thompson, a member of a paratroop company stationed at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, was the tortfeasor who injured the plaintiffs in a
collision in South Carolina, between his own personal car and that in which
plaintiffs were passengers. At the time, he was enroute from Fort Bragg to
the new station to which he had been ordered at Elgin Field, Florida. The
movement of the entire company was accomplished by truck convoy and air
transport, but Sgt. Thompson and a few others who owned automobiles
obtained permission to drive them to Elgin Field, traveling at their own
expense and responsibility and without allowance of mileage and under
passes which imposed no duty on them except to report to Elgin Field at
midnight on September 10, 1948. Thompson, in driving his own car, was
subject to no orders with respect thereto. He had been given a briefing,
which was no more than general information as to the best available route
to follow, but he was under no duty to follow this route so long as he report
upon the expiration of his pass.
69. In so doing, the court relied on Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135,
71 Sup. Ct. 153, 95 L. Ed. 152 (1950); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332
U.S. 301, 67 Sup. Ct. 1604, 91 L. Ed. 2067 (1947); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 62 Sup. Ct. 676, 86 L. Ed. 956 (1942);
Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 60 Sup. Ct. 480, 84 L. Ed. 694 (1940).
70. United States v. Sharpe, 189 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir. 1951).
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from United States v. Eleazer,71 and observed that plaintiff's reliance
rested on cases holding the master liable for the negligence of a
servant operating an automobile in the master's business, even though
the vehicle belonged to the servant. Thus the basic question raised
was in whose service and about whose business was the tortfeasor
at the time of the occurrence. A fortiori, the only competent sources
for making such a determination, factually and legally, were federal
in nature.7 2 Implicit in this decision, was the court's reference to
federal sources to ascertain the existence and nature of the soldier-
Government relationship before applying the appropriate principles
of agency law to the fact elements thus involved. 3
It would appear necessary to note at this point that in touching
upon cases involving military or naval personnel, the phrase, "act-
ing in line of duty"7 4 has a permissively broader scope where applied
to the relationship of soldier-Government inter se, since that concept
is the basis for payment of benefits for death, injury and disability
to the serviceman or his dependents and survivors. 5 It is in this
respect analogous to state workmens' compensation benefits, social
security coverage or compensation for federal employees,76 all of
71. 177 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1949). In the Eleazer case, the only pertinent
factual variation was that the tortfeasor, a Marine Corps officer, was driving
his own outomobile on a trip home while on deferred leave. There the
court aptly observed that the Government had no right to direct his driving,.and when he elected to drive his own car instead of availing himself of
commercial transportation, he was acting in furtherance of his own purposes,
not those of the Government. Id. at 917.
72. The court also observed that the law in South Carolina, as elsewhere,
imposed no liability on the master where the servant operated the car for
his own purposes. See RESTATEmENT, AGENCY § 235 (1933).
73. Agency is a mixed question of fact and law and it is the function
of the triers of fact to determine its existence unless the inference is clear
and beyond doubt, in which case the court may make the finding. RESTATE-
mENT, AGENCY § 220(2) and comment b (1933). The alleged agent himself
may not testify against the principal as to the existence or scope of his
authority unless and until established by other evidence. This is especially
true where the existence or scope of the agency is an "operative" or "ulti-
mate" fact determining the fixation of liability, in which case it becomes
substantive rather than procedural. Id. § 284 and comment c, § 285, comment
d. See Note 55 supra. See also Brownell v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co.,
121 F.2d 239, 244 (1st Cir. 1941); Ralston Purina Co. v. Novak, Il F.2d 631,
637 (8th Cir. 1940); Nichols v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 89 F.2d 927, 929
(5th Cir. 1937); United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Exploration Co.
v. Wallapai Mining & Development Co., 27 Ariz. 126, 230 Pac. 1109 (1924);
Ennis v. Smith, 171 Wash. 126, 18 P.2d 1 (1933). Contra: Garford Trucking
Corp. v. Mann, 163 F.2d 71 (1st Cir. 1947).
74. 28 U.S.CA. § 2671 (1950).
75. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C.A. § 903 (1927) (payment of six months pay to
serviceman's widow); 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 151 et seq., 501, 701, 706, 718, 725, 731,
740, 741 (1942); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139, 140, 144, 71 Sup.
Ct. 153, 95 L. Ed. 152 (1950); O'Neil v. United States, 202 F.2d 366 (D.C.
Cir. 1953); Archer v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Pettis
v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 500 (N.D. Cal. 1952); cf. Brooks v. United States,
337 U.S. 49, 53, 54, 69 Sup. Ct. 918, 93 L. Ed. 1200 (1949).
76. See supra p.214 and n.49 (federal employees compensation), p.212' (social
security); Moore v. United States, 48 Ct. Cl. 110 (1913); 32 Ops. ATT'Y GEN.
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which radically deviate from the accepted legal requirements for
creation of the master-servant relationship, since they fall into the
category of "social legislation." To use this broad aspect of the "line
of duty" concept involving the soldier-Government relationship inter
se as the basis of vicarious liability-involving relations of the mili-
tary to third persons outside of Government-would obviously pro-
duce astounding and clearly unintended results of a fantastic nature.77
This was made clear in United States v. Campbell,"8 where the court
illustrates the reductio ad absurdum of such contention by adverting
to an article by Commander Horace Bird in a popular magazine
humorously entitled "How Beulah Sank the Admirals." 0
In Rutherford v. United States,8° wherein the defendant's motion
for summary judgment was granted, we find reasoning akin to that
employed in United States v. Sharpe. The court found that although
concededly the tortfeasor was a member of the United States naval
forces at the time of the accident, he was not acting within the scope
of his employment; upon completion of the recruiting broadcast his
duty was finished, and he was on his own and was then using his own
private automobile for his own private purpose.
In Hubsch v. United States and Schweitzer v. United States,"' on
the basis of the facts found by the court of appeals from record in
193 (1920); 32 Ops. ATr'y GEN. 12 (1919).
77. The doctrine of "equitable construction" may be used to avoid the
imposition of liability based on such misconstruction. Matson Navigation Co. v.
United States, 284 U.S. 352, 52 Sup. Ct. 162, 76 L. Ed. 336 (1932); Church of
the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 12 Sup. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed.
226 (1892); 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 6006 (3d ed., Horack,
1943).
78. 172 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1949).
79. The author, Commander Bird, quotes from a letter supposed to have
been written to an unnamed Congressman: "'I had a heap of trouble with a
girl last summer, and she was having a baby in August, and me and her old
man got into a quarrel and he shot me in the left shoulder. The boys tell
me that I can get retired and paid by the navy for disability for injury
received in line of duty. Since I was in line of duty when it first happened;
though I didn't get shot until later, can I get the money?' (Emphasis sup-
plied.)" Id. at 502 n.4.
80. 73 F. Supp. 867 (E. D. Tenn. 1947), aff'd per curiam, 168 F.2d 70 (6th
Cir. 1948), 36 GEo. L.J. 276. The undisputed facts indicated that the tortfeasor,
a Navy petty officer, assigned to recruiting activities in designated Tennessee
counties, including that of the situs of the tort, injured the plantiff in an
automobile collision in Knoxville on a Sunday morning in March, 1946. At
the time, Petty Officer Winniger had completed his part in a Navy recruiting
and reserve radio broadcast and was proceeding in his personally owned car
toward his home outside Knoxville to spend the balance of the day with his
family. The car was used exclusively for the private and personal purposes
of Winniger and his family. In connection with his recruiting duties, he
was furnished with a Government-owned station wagon which was used in
that activity.
81. 174 F.2d 7 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 338 U.S. 814, remanded for settle-
;nent, 338 U.S. 440 (1949). The tortfeasor, an Army lieutenant stationed at
Key Largo, some 60 miles from Miami, Florida, drove an Army jeep, tem-
porarily assigned to him from his station at Key Largo, to the Miami Air
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the lower court, it was determined that Government should not: be
held liable, since the officer was not acting within the scope of his
employment as required by Section 1346 (b). The court stated that
"the Government has not consented to be sued or to be liable for
injuries caused by the negligent acts of its employees who are in
and about their own personal and private enterprises."' 2 More im-
portantly, however, the court again ruled out the application of the
Florida permissive use statute imposing liability on the owner of a
vehicle for its negligent operation by another, with his knowledge
and consent, even though the Florida law had been construed to
make a private owner liable for injuries caused by its negligent op-
eration, regardless of whether or not the driver was about the busi-
ness of the owner. Because of the provisions of the federal law,83
the court held that the Florida doctrine of liability for negligent op-
eration outside the scope of the owner's .business could have no ap-
plication; nor could any presumptious arising out of such doctrine
prevail against the United States as a statutory defendant.8 4 The
recent application in a diversity action of this same statute to a
private individual by the same federal district court which decided
the Hubsch case serves to underscore the distinction.85
Depot to pick up a jeep regularly assigned to him, which had been left for
repairs. Because it was Saturday afternoon (July 13, 1946) when he arrived,
he was unable to accomplish the purpose of his trip; he proceeded to Miami
Beach where he spent the night, and after having consumed considerable
alcohol, was, on Sunday morning, going to breakfast when the collision
occurred. The officer had intended to stay over until Monday morning and
then go to the Miami Air Depot to obtain the repaired jeep regularly assigned
to him.
82. Id. at 9.
83. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (1950).
84. In so ruling, the court cited with approval other cases in which local
law would have made the United States liable, had it been applied. E.g.,
Clemens v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 971 (D. Minn. 1950) (driver of Army
automobile injured the plaintiff while taking another soldier into town to
meet the latter's girl friend); Cropper v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 81 (N.D.
Fla. 1948) (soldier, assigned to dri-Ve Army staff car for chaplain, disregarded
chaplain's instructions to return car to motor pool for further assignment
and drove to a city 45 miles away where he had an accident); Murphey v.
United States, 79 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 179
F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1950) (soldier was authorized to carry men from radar
station near town of Klamath into town for entertainment when men were
off-duty; this authority required vehicle to remain parked in town to return
the men to post after evening's entertainment; special permission was re-
quired for use of car to go elsewhere; accident occurred when two sergeants
and their lady companions were using car to attend an Indian ceremonial
dance held a short distance from the center of town); Long v. United States,
78 F. Supp. 35 (S.D. Cal. 1948) (civilian driver of Army staff car drove
some 20 miles beyond instructed designation where a collision occurred
injuring plaintiff; California law being in derogaton of the respondeat superor
qualification of the federal law, was held inapplicable); Rutherford v. United
States. 73 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Tenn. 1947). See Forrester v. Jerman, 90 F.2d
412 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (lists 20 states having similar statutes).
85. Mark v. City of Ormond Beach, 113 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. Fla. 1953). In
this case the court held that the statute established a presumption of the
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In Parrish v. United States, 6 no permissive use statute was in-
volved, but the court took judicial notice of applicable Army regula-
tions87 forbidding the use of Government vehicles for the private or
personal purposes of military personnel. In this case, the court denied
liability of the United States under Section 1346 (b), where the driver
of the Army car at the time of the alleged tort was transporting the
personal household goods of an Army officer under an arrangement
whereby the officer paid per diem and all expenses of the Army
driver as well as for gas and oil. The court found this venture clearly
out of the scope of employment of the Army driver, notwithstanding
the purported authorization for the trip by order of the Command-
ing Officer of the appropriate military district.88
In Bach v. United States,8 9 the plaintiffs sustained injuries in an
automobile collision in New York. The car with which they collided
was driven by a naval officer on week-end leave who was returning
from a visit to Philadelphia. The officer was under no particular
orders from 4:30 P.M. Friday until 8:00 A.M. Monday; such leave
was commonly referred to as an off-duty status. The court had
no difficulty under this simple state of facts in finding that the naval
officer was not acting within the scope of his employment and that
the purpose of the trip was personal. It did, however, look to the
law of the state where the act occurred, New Jersey, first to determine
the liability of a master-employer for the negligence of a servant-
owner's liability which presumption touching upon burden of proof was sub-
stantive and hence could not be taken away from the plaintiff.
86. 95 F. Supp. 80 (M.D. Ga. 1950).
87. See note 66 supra.
88. By conceivable analogy to the local law of private employment, the
principal might be held liable under a theory of ratification. AESTATEMENT,
AGENcY § 218 (1933) (assuming the authorizing official of the private firm
ordinarily exercised comparable authority). In Greenwood v. United States,
97 F. Supp. 996 (D. Ky. 1951), the lack of authority of Private Rayno to
take an Army truck off the Ft. Knox Reservation was the basis for the court's
finding him not acting in line of duty when he collided with plaintiff's car
on U. S. Highway 60, on his way to a liquor store to buy whiskey for his
personal use. There was considerable, but inconclusive, evidence that Private
Reyno was intoxicated at the time. Nevertheless, the case turned on un-
authorized use of the vehicle, in no way connected with the business of the
United States. The court relied upon the authority of Parrish v. United
States, 95 F. Supp. 80 (M.D. Ga. 1950), in support of its conclusion. King
v. United States, 178 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1950), was another case where use
of Government property without authority, knowledge or consent was a
basis for finding the operator not acting in line of duty. The instrumentality
involved was an Air Force AT-6 training plane which was taken over the
city of San Antonio, Texas, on a low-level flight by an Air Force cadet in
training at Randolph Field. The cadet, shortly after midnight, while under
the influence of liquor, took off in the plane and crashed into plaintiff's
home, set it on fire and destroyed it. It thus appears that lack of authority
to use the particular Governmental instrumentality will in practically all
cases exculpate the United States. See notes 59 and 60 supra.
89. 92 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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employee.90 It thereafter cited United States v. Eleazer, and other
cases under the Federal Tort Claims Act which applied federal com-
mon-law principles of agency.
At this point, it is essential to note that despite some dicta that
local law controls,91 it is the federal rule as to scope of employment
which, correctly governs cases under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
This principle underlies many of the cases thus far decided, but it
has not been emphasized because there are few instances of diver-
gence between the federal and the local rule. The situation is dis-
cussed by the court in United States v. Lushbough:
"There is an apparent conflict between the decisions of the courts of
appeals, in some instances a conflict more apparent than real, on the
question whether Federal courts are bound by the law of the State in
which the injury or damage was sustained in determining whether at
the critical time and place the employee of the United States was acting
within the scope of his office or employment. In the Fourth Circuit the
rule is that in such actions local law is not controlling. United States v.
Eleazer, 4 Cir., 177 F.2d 914, 916; United States v. Sharpe, 4 Cir., 189 F.2d
239, 241.... And see Williams v. United States, D. C., 105 F. Supp. 208,
209; Hubsch v. United States, 5 Cir., 174 F.2d 7, 9; Problems Under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. Yankwich, 9 F.R.D. 143, 150-152, 155-159. De-
cisions under the Act in which Federal courts apparently applied State
law in determining the issue under discussion are Murphey v. United
States, 9 Cir., 179 F.2d 743; United States v. Johnson, 9 Cir., 181 F.2d 577;
United States v. Wibye, 9 Cir., 191 F.2d 181; and Christian v. United
States, 6 Cir., 184 F.2d 523.1192
Absent any controlling federal authority, it would seem that the
federal courts must evolve their own rule of law.
93
The fact situation in United States v. Lushbough is somewhat dif-
ferent in that it involved civilian rather than military personnel.94
90. The district court, in so doing gave only lip service to the normal
conflict of laws rule applicable to private individuals in diversity of citizen-
ship cases. See note 55 supra.
91. See United States v. Lushbough, 200 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir. 1950);
United States v. Wibye, 191 F.2d 181, 183 (9th Cir. 1951); Christian v. United
States, 184 F.2d 523, 525 (6th Cir. 1950); United States v. Johnson, 181 F.2d
577, 580, 581 (9th Cir. 1950); Murphey v. United States, 179 F.2d 743, 746
(9th Cir. 1950); United States v. Campbell, 172 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 1949);
Bach v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 715, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
92. 200 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir. 1952).
93. See note 52 supra.
94. The tortfeasor was a student at the Missouri School of Mines, Rolla,
Missouri, who during his summer vacation was engaged to work for the
United States Geological Survey under the general supervision of the project
engineer. He was attached to a field party under the immediate supervision
of one of the older trainees, known as the party chief. During August, 1950,
Hoffman, the tortfeasor, was shifted from the party in Sturgis, South Dakota,
to Belle Fourche, about 32 miles away, exchanging units with one Brucker,
formerly in the Belle Fourche party. Because of this swap, both men left
some of their personal items at their original stations. On the night of
August 11, 1950, Hoffman received permission from his party chief at Belle
Fourche to use the Survey truck to return to Sturgis to retrieve his laundry-
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The court found the Government driver was engaged exclusively
upon a personal errand in no manner connected with the work he
was doing for the United States; hence he was not within the scope
of his employment. It observed that the same result would follow
regardless of whether it applied local or federal law.
Another recent case under the Federal Tort Claims Act, also in-
volving a civilian employee, sharply points up the choice of federal
vis-a-vis state law in the determination of scope of employment. In
Field v. United States9 5 the plaintiff sued for damages to his auto-
mobile resulting from a collision with a Government vehicle being
driven by an employee of the War Assets Administration. Upon
trial, the Government admitted ownership of the car driven by its
employee. The testimony of the driver of plaintiff's automobile, that
the employee at the time of the accident, stated that he was on Gov-
ernment business, was admitted by the court as being within the
res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. Nevertheless, the court in
its considered opinion after review of the evidence rules held the
statement incompetent to establish agency.90 Plaintiff introduced no
further evidence on the question of agency. The court found, on
the basis of other evidence, that the employee's negligence caused
the accident.
The court refused to allow plaintiff the benefit of the Illinois per-
missive use statute, under which a rebuttable presumption would
have arisen in his favor (upon proof of defendant's ownership of
the vehicle) not only that the driver was the agent of the owner,
but also that the agent was acting within the scope of his employ-
ment. The court regarded the nonconclusive presumption of the
Illinois statute as procedural rather than substantive, since it did
not shift the burden of proof (which it properly characterized as
substantive), but only the burden of going forward with the evi-
dence; the ultimate risk of non-persuasion of the court or jury was
still upon the plaintiff. The court further noted the standard of state
law as the prescribed measure of liability under the federal statute,
and its necessary restriction, where applicable, within the boundaries
of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. It quite correctly and properly pointed out,
however, that the Erie doctrine, although applicable in diversity
cases, was by its own terms97 made inapplicable to matters governed
He also took along a pair of shoes Brucker had left at Belle Fourche. He was
accompanied on this trip by Daniel Knock, another trainee. They left Sturgis
at about 12:30 A.M. on August 12 and on this return trip collided with a car
driven by plaintiff. The court found that Hoffman was not acting within the
scope of his employment under either federal or local law.
95. 107 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. 1ll. 1952).
96. See note 73 supra.
97. "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution, or by Acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State." Erie
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by the Constitution and federal statutes. Hence, its refusal to follow
the state permissive use statute in this case finds ample support in
the federal statutes and in legal authority. As a logical sequitur to
this reasoning, the court adverted to the statutory definition of scope
of employment found in Section 2671 of the Judicial Code and the
uniquely federal sources governing the federal employer-employee
relationship, which led it to properly conclude that federal, not state,
law was the criterion to measure scope of employment under such
circumstances.
The discussion of this topic necessarily includes McConvile v.
United States,98 since the court, apart from its consideration of frolic,
detour and return to scope of employment, starts out with an observa-
tion that the driver of the Army truck was in fact authorized to use
it pursuant to Army regulations. It thereby sought to differentiate
this case from United States v. EZeazer, 9 Rutherford v. United
States,L0 King v. United States'01 and Parrish v. United States.0 2
The court noted that the Army driver was engaged in a permissible
activity for the Army when he pased the sentry at the Field Gate. 0 3
It affirmed the decision of the district court by stating that it could
not, as a matter of law, say the district court erred in holding the
driver "reasonably proximate to the scope of his employment" when
he had completed two of the seven miles back toward the warehouse.
While the court purported to apply New York law to ascertain
when the driver was again back in line of duty or scope of employ-
ment, it appears that New York cases indicate that he had not yet
entered the scope of his employment." 4 This decision seemingly based
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938)
(italics added).
98. 197 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 877 (1952).
99. 177 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 903 (1950).
100. 73 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Tenn. 1947).
101. 178 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 964 (1950).
102. 95 F. Supp. 80 (M.D. Ga. 1950).
103. Sergeant Anderson, the driver of the colliding Army car was stationed
at Mitchel Field, Hempstead, Long Island. On the evening of the accident, he
had been drinking beer at the WAC Recreation Hall. Shortly after returning
to his duties in charge of the quartermaster warehouse, a lieutenant requested
a bed and mattress. There were none available. Hence, it was necessary for
him to go over to the warehouse, about two miles away from the field to get
the needed equipment. The motor pool issued him a truck for this purpose.
He then took four other soldiers along and was cleared by the sentry at the
West Gate at about 12:30 A.M. After leaving the field, he drove the truck
for a short distance southeast in the direction of the warehouse. Sergeant
Anderson then turned southwest to a bar where he and his companions drank
beer. Thereafter, he drove some seven miles away from Mitchel Field and
the warehouse to visit another bar. His four companions remained at this
bar and Sergeant Anderson proceeded toward the warehouse alone. The
collision occurred at 2:00 AM. when he had completed about two miles of his
return trip.
104. Cohen v. City of New York, 215 App. Div. 382, 213, N.Y. Supp. 710
(1st Dep't), aff'd, 243 N.Y. 561, 154 N.E. 605 (1926); Carty v. Acker, Merral
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only upon the mental attitude of the wayward servant seems
peripheral, at best, under local law and serves to underscore the
need for application of a uniform rule of federal common law. The
employment relationship of Government and soldier together with
its incidents involving the scope, nature and consequences is dis-
tinctively federal in character. 05 United States v. Standard Oil
Co. 6 points out that the incidents of such relationship have no locus
in any one state, but must be measured by resort to federal law and
decisions to insure uniformity. The authority of the military to issue
regulations governing servicemen0 7 is but another example of the
impropriety of using local law to guage this relationship. This same
principle is applicable with equal force to civilian employees of the
Government, who likewise are subject to federal laws and depart-
mental regulations governing their status vis-a-vis the United States
as the employer. This point is fully treated in Part II, dealing with
Employee of the Government. The McConville case thus stands at
variance with the large and rapidly growing body of decisions calling
for application of federal common law to govern the characteristics
and incidents arising from employer-employee relationships having
their roots in federal sources. 08
Other Exceptions from Local Law
In this treatment of exceptions from the law of the place criterion
prescribed by the Federal Tort Claims Act, it is apposite to note
that these exceptions underscore the general rule that substantive
state law continues to be the determinative factor in the existence
of a cause of action against the United States within the framework
of the statute.0 9 It has been shown in the preceding discussion that
& Condit Co., 210 App. Div. 789, 206 N.Y. Supp. 773 (1st Dep't 1924); Graves
v. Utica Candy Co., 209 App. Div. 193, 204 N.Y. Supp. 682 (4th Dep't 1924);
Walter v. Upson, 206 App. Div. 652, 198 N.Y. Supp. 955 (4th Dep't 1923),
aff'd, 237 N.Y. 541, 143 N.E. 755 (1924); Campbell v. Warner, 200 App. Div.
888, 192 N.Y. Supp. 404 (1st Dep't 1922), rev'd, 234 N.Y. 645, 138 N.E. 481
(1923). In Riley v. Standard Oil Co., 231 N.Y. 301, 305, 132 N.E. 97 (1921),
it was held that re-entry is not accomplished by mental attitude alone, but by
a combination of attitude and reasonable connection in time and space with
the servant's work.
Lowe v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Mo. 1949), is distinguishable
from the McConville case in that the civilian employee operating the Army
bus had returned to the immediate vicinity of his route at the time of the
collision.
105. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141-43, 71 Sup. Ct. 153, 95
L. Ed. 152 (1950); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305, 67
Sup. Ct. 1604, 91 L. Ed. 2067 (1947).
106. 332 U.S. 301, 305, 67 Sup. Ct. 1604, 91 L. Ed. 2067 (1947).
107. See note 66 supra.
108. See notes 52, 84 supra.
109. See notes 6 and 29 supra. The essential, fairness of this approach is
nowhere more manifest than in the field of damages, where the sovereign
accords its humblest citizen the same right of restitution for personal injury
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it is only where the unique relationship of the Federal Government
to its employees, military and civilian, requires application of federal
standards that departure from local law is proper. Such exceptions
constitute inevitable recognition that there exist certain areas where
Government qua Government can never divest itself of its sovereign
capacity."0
Perhaps it is this concept, though often unrecorded in published
decision, as well as the express limitations of the law,"' which tacitly
influences judicial thinking in terms of governmental liability.12
Absolute Liability
Prior to enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the sovereign
could not be sued in tort, except in those isolated instances where
Congress might, by special act, waive immunity for a particular case.
In making the United States amenable to suit in tort, the Congress
conditioned liability upon the existence of a negligent or wrongful
act or omission on the part of an employee of the Government. Thus,
the court's finding of such an act or omission constituting proximate
causation was the touchstone and the sine qua non of any recovery
under the new tort law.
Nevertheless, the same section of the law provided that the United
States should be liable in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under local law. Earlier discussion herein
has shown the nonapplicability of certain aspects of state law to the
sovereign, especially the state permissive use statutes relating to
the operation of automobiles.
Another important conflict has developed in the field of aviation
law where the state law provides for absolute liability, without fault
or negligence on part of the operator of the plane which causes dam-
ages to persons or property on the ground. It appears that twenty-
three states have adopted Section 5 of the Uniform Aeronautics Act" 3
or property damage against it which the injured party would have against
any other resident of that jurisdiction. The need for such remedy due to
"larger" Government is shown in Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306 U.S. 381, 390-
92, 59 Sup. Ct. 576, 83 L. Ed. 784 (1939). Also see Hearings before Subcom-
mittee of Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2690, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 18
(1940) ("Rule of Thumb" practice which Act superseded).
110. The committee reports on the Act and its predecessor bills all carry
language in the exceptions clause excluding from coverage "claims which
relate to certain governmental activities which should be free from threat of
damage suit." See, e.g., SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946);
H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945); H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1942).
111. See notes 62, 63 and 64 supra.
112. Cf. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 43-45, 73 Sup. Ct. 956, 97
L. Ed. 1427 (1953); Feres v..United States, 340 U.S. 135, 142, 71 Sup. Ct. 153,
95 L. Ed. 152 (1950).
113. For a listing of the twenty-three states with statutory citations, see
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providing for absolute liability, although four of them have removed
this proviso and now base liability upon the rules of torts applicable
to accidents on land." 4
This doctrine, in states having such a law, has been applied to
commercial planes operating as common carriers for profit,"'15 but
such application only serves to underscore the impropriety of holding
the Government responsible under a similar standard. The analogy
is especially persuasive in favor of a different standard for the
sovereign where it operates military, naval or Civil Aeronautics
Agency planes, not for profit and not as common carriers, but in the
interest of national defense, national security and flying safety opera-
tions. Additionally, it would seem reasonable that the sovereign,
until recently immune from suit at all, should not be held uncondi-
tionally and absolutely liable under a limited statutory waiver of
immunity conditioned upon the existence of a negligent or wrongful
act or omission. A fortiori, the step from no liability to absolute
liability would, on its face, be subject to caveat.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in its November
9, 1953, decision in United States v. Praylot 6 has squarely raised this
issue by holding the United States absolutely liable for personal
injuries and property damages caused by a crash of a military plane
on the plaintiff's land in South Carolina, which state has an absolute
liability law -modeled upon Section 5 of the Uniform Aeronautics
Act.i 7 The absolute liability problem was also the subject of an earlier
RHYmE, AVIATIoN ACcmENT LAw 66 n.14 (1947). Section 5 of the Uniform
Aeronautics Act provides: 'Damage on Land-The owner of every aircraft
which is operated over the lands or waters of this state is absolutely liable
for injuries to persons or property on the land or water beneath, caused
by the ascent, descent or flight of the aircraft, or the dropping or falling of
any object therefrom, whether such owner was negligent or not, unless the
m3ury is caused in whole or in part by the negligence of the person injured,
or of the owner or bailee of the property injured. If the aircraft is leased
at the time of the injury to person or property, both owner and leasee shall
be liable, and they may be sued jointly, or either or both of them may be
sued separately. An aeronaut who is not the owner or leasee shall be liable
only for the consequences of his own negligence. The injured person, or
owner or bailee of the injured property, shall have a lien on the aircraft
causing the injury to the extent of the damage caused by the aircraft or
objects falling from it." 11 U.L.A. 161, 162 (1938).
114. RnY-E, op. cit. supra note 113, at 66 n.13; 14 J.D.C. BM Ass'N 435
(1947).
115. See, e.g., Smith v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corp., 76 F. Supp.
940 (D.D.C. 1948); McCusker v. Curtis-Wright Flying Service, 269 Ill. App.
502, [1933] U.S. Av. REP. 105.
116. 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953).
117. S.C. CoDn § 2.6 (1952). It should be noted that the Uniform Aero-
nautics Act, including Section 5, was withdrawn in 1943 from active pro-
munlgation pending further study by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws. 9 U.L.A. xvi (1951). See also note 113
supra. The government plans to petition the Supreme Court to take certiorari
in the Praylou case because of conflict with other courts of appeals decisions
and with the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the Dalehite case. A
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ruling by Judge Moore in Parcell v. United States,"s which involved
property damage caused by the crash of two Air Force jet fighter
planes in West Virginia. Although that state is not one of the twenty-
three jurisdictions having an absolute liability statute, the court never-
theless found the Government liable under this doctrine predicated
upon its participation in an ultra-hazardous activity. It further found
a basis for liability under trespass quaire clausum fregit.119 It applied
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and decided that the evidence ad-
duced by defendant failed to overcome the presumption of negligence
involved in the defendant's operations.120 It should be noted in the
early consideration of the concept of absolute liability that but for
singular deviations, such as found in Green v. General Petroleum
Corp.,' 21 and implicit in Exner v. Sherman Power Construction Co.,12
that no respectable support for such postulate exists in Anglo-Ameri-
can law.
123
Other decisions under the Federal Tort Claims Act, moreover, are
in direct conflict with the Praylou case. The Supreme Court in Dale-
hite v. United States, 24 expressly ruled out the application of such
doctrine as a basis for liability on the part of the United States under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, pointing out that the statute expressly
ruling by the Supreme Court would be of great aid in clarifying the law in
a field where this question is bound to recur with increasing frequency.
The American Law Institute, feeling that the rules stated in Restatement,
Torts concerning absolute liability for airplane crashes were undesirable,
have cooperated with the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in drafting
a proposed act based on negligence rather than absolute liability. [1938]
HANDBOOK OF NAT. CONF. OF Comn'RS ON UNIFonmr STATE LAWS 71; [1948]
id. at 147, 149. Several states have adopted "this more modern view" that
the ordinary standards of care rather than absolute liability apply to aircraft
accidents. Kadylak v. O'Brien, [1941] U.S. Av. REP. 8 (W.D. Pa.); Johnson
v. Central Aviation Corp., 103 Cal. App.2d 102, 229 P.2d 114, 120 (1951);
Herrick v. Curtiss Flying Service, [1932] U.S. Av. REP. 110, 113, 117, 118,
122, 131 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) ; see also RHYsE, AvIATION AcciDENT LAW 64-65 (1947).
118. 104 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. W. Va. 1951). This case was compromised for
a relatively small sum prior to any appellate ruling, however, and was
dismissed as moot.
119. The early English common law imposed liability for invasion of land
in possession of another without regard to fault or harm. RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 166, comment d (1934); cf. id. § 65. See Gregory, Trespass to Negli-
gence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 392-95 (1951). Cf. Dalehite
v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 44, 45, 73 Sup. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427 (1953).
120. For application of res ipsa loquitur in other aircraft Tort Claims cases,
see, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 194 F.2d 974, 977 (5th Cir. 1952); United
States v. Gaidy, 194 F.2d 762 (10th Cir. 1952); United States v. Kesinger,
190 F.2d 529, 531-33 (10th Cir. 1951); D'Anna v. United States, 181 F.2d 335,
337 (4th Cir. 1950). A reading of these cases leaves one with the impression
that the res ipsa doctrine has often been used to reach a determination
equivalent to absolute liability without express reliance upon this principle.
121. 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928).
122. 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931).
123. Gregory's criticism of these two cases emphasizes their unique status
in the law. Gregory, supra note 119, at 388-95.
124. 346 U.S. 15, 73 Sup. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427 (1953).
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requires a negligent act.1 25 A number of other decisions following
the Dalehite case have ruled out absolute liability under the Act.
At this point, the advocates of absolute liability might also wish to
consider potential liability engendered by the development of the
atomic energy program.
126
Since the cases adverted to under the absolute liability topic fall
within that section of the statute dealing with exceptions from its
coverage, viz., Section 2680 (a), it is appropriate to note another recent
ruling fitting under a related clause of the same section. In Stepp
v. United States,127 the plaintiff in seeking to avoid the exception of
Section 2680 (h) -assault and battery-pleaded the Alaska law classify-
ing this tort as an "assault with a dangerous weapon" rather than
assault and battery since Alaska law defines assault and battery as
an act committed by one "not being armed with a dangerous weapon."
The court, however, in rejecting this contention stated:
"... where the United States excepts itself from certain liabilities, as
in Section 2680 of the Federal Tort Claims Act, such exceptions must be
interpreted under the general law rather than under some peculiar in-
terpretation of a State or Territory."'
128
In Duenges v. United States, 29 the court relied upon the exception
to coverage by the federal law of claims arising out of "false arrest"
125. Heale v. United States, 207 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1953) (blasting case,
remanded to district court for findings as to existence of negligence); Harris
v. United States, 205 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1953) (damage to crops of adjoining
landowner resulting from airplane spraying chemical herbicide to destroy
willow growth on Government-owned land); United States v. Inmon, 205
F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1953) (injury to 14 year-old boy from explosion of Army
blasting cap found by him on private property formerly leased by United
States for Army camp; the land had been released to the owner and had
changed hands four times before the injury occurred); Danner v. United
States, 114 F. Supp. 477 (W.D. Mo. 1953) (plaintiff's land flooded as a result
of collapse of embankment built by Corps of Engineers in emplementation of
Government flood control program); Flores v. United States, 105 F. Supp.
640, 642 (D. N. Mex. 1952) (plaintiff searching for scrap materials injured
by explosion of undetonated bomb fuse on land formerly leased by United
States for practice bombing range; land was decontaminated before release
by Government; this ruling preceded the Dalehite case).
126. The Thirteenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission,
SEM. Doc. No. 3, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 87, 88 (1953), indicates a healthy number
of concussion damage claims from each of the therein described series of
blasts. Albeit, none of these claims exceeded $1,000 in amount and 89% were
adjusted administratively by the Commission under Section 2672 of the Ju-
dicial Code.
127. 207 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1953). This case involved a suit for the alleged
wrongful death of a civilian seaman, who in June of 1948 was serving on
an L.S.T. operated by the Army Transport Service. While the ship was
docked at Anchorage, Alaska, at about 2:00 A.M., the decedent approached
the dock to board ship. The dock was guarded by a sentry whose duty it was
to challenge all persons coming on the dock and prevent any member of the
crew from carrying intoxicants upon the dock. In the enforcement of this
duty, the sentry, after due warning to Stepp, shot him when he failed to stop
running away.
128. Id. at 911.
129. 114 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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and "false imprisonment"'130 to hold the United States not liable for
the arrest and imprisonment of the plaintiff subsequent to his honor-
able discharge from the service, thereby denying his claim for
mental anguish, loss of freedom and loss of earnings during the period
of his wrongful detention. The plaintiff, in an effort to by-pass the
statutory exception, vainly sought to predicate his cause of action
upon the negligent keeping of the Government's records, alleging
this to be the actionable basis of his claim. In rejecting this proffered
basis of liability, the court correctly observed that in an action for
negligence, "damage" was the very essence of the plaintiff's case,
since the negligent keeping of records would only become an action-
able wrong upon the event of subsequent injury directly attributable
thereto.1' 1
In Jones v. United States, 32 the plaintiffs sought recovery of the
difference in the value of their oil stock, based upon the actual return
from the sale thereof and its value, predicated upon present authori-
tative estimates of the production capacity of the oil producing lands
involved. The complaint charged the Geological Survey with negli-
gently and deceitfully giving to the plaintiffs an incorrect estimate of
the oil reserves.
The court of appeals, in sustaining the lower court's dismissal of
the complaint, invoked that part of the exception of Section 2680 (h)
listing "misrepresentation" and "deceit" as torts not covered by the
sovereign waiver of immunity from suit. As to the second charge of
the complaint, "deceit," the court, citing Silverton v. United States,133
found the statutory language a clear bar.
As to the first charge, "negligent misrepresentation," the court
reasoned that since "deceit" meant fraudulent misrepresentation, "mis-
representation" must have encompassed negligent misrepresentation.
130. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(h) (1950).
131. Such ruling accords with a basic concept in the law of torts that
damage must proximately result from the defendant's negligent act. Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); McCoRMcK, DAMAGES
100 (1935).
132. 207 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1953). In October of 1946 the plaintiff, Clayton
Jones, wrote to the United States Geological Survey for information on the
estimated oil bearing capacity of certain Government-owned land in Wyoming
which had been leased to the Empire State Oil Company of Thermopolis,
Wyoming. The company had issued common stock upon their oil producing
rights in the leased land. The Geological Survey by letter of November 29,
1946, gave to Jones an estimate of the oil reserves at the rate of 17,400 bbls.
per acre at a time when it had sufficient information available for accurate
computation of ultimate oil recovery from this land. The plaintiffs, fourteen
months after receipt of this letter from the Geological Survey and in reliance
upon this estimate, sold their stock at $1.72 per share. The Geological Survey
estimate was in error by about 300 per cent and by 1951 the barrel-per-acre
yield had exceeded the 17,400 bbl. per acre estimate of the Geological Survey.
By the time of suit this stock had a value of $5.16 per share.
133. 200 F.2d 824 (1st Cir. 1952).
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This construction was adopted to avoid interpretation of the latter
term as duplicative of the former,18 4 the court thereby following a
cardinal rule in the field of statutory construction.1ar In reaching its
conclusion the court tacitly adopted the contention of the defendant
that even if the complaint did state a claim upon which relief could
be granted against a private individual, the prohibition of the federal
law was insurmountable and hence must govern. By analogy with
the exception pertaining to "libel," also contained in the same sec-
tion, it concluded that negligent or intentional misrepresentations
were both covered.
By a parity of reasoning and with express reliance upon the deci-
sion in the Jones case the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York dismissed the complaint in Panella v. United
States,3 6 without passing upon the grounds urged by the Government
in the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court held
plaintiff's cause of action to fall within the exception of Section
2680 (h), which preserved sovereign immunity for claims arising out
of certain intentional torts including assault and battery. As in
Jones v. United States, the court found the gravamen of the com-
plaint undeniably stated a cause of action on the mentioned grounds,
rather than upon negligent supervision and control, as urged by the
plaintiff.18 7 It further emphasized the separate and distinct coverage
of the terms, "assault" and "battery," by noting the "intentional"
aspect of the term "assault" to prevent its consideration as merely
duplicative of the term "battery" in the statutory sense of "ejusdem
134. The Government's brief carefully pointed out that in most jurisdic-
tions, since Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889), it was recognized that
the common-law action of deceit would not lie for mere negligent misrepre-
sentation.
135. Words of a statute are not to be construed as surplusage but each
is to be given a meaning consonant with rational legislative intent. McDonald
v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 263, 266, 59 Sup. Ct. 176, 83 L. Ed. 164 (1938); D.
Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208, 52 Sup. Ct. 322, 76 L. Ed. 704
(1932); Hurley v. United States, 192 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1951); United
States v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 150 F.2d 369, 379 (7th Cir. 1945).
136. 117 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The facts and holding are listed
under the style, United States v. Wilcox. Actually the Paneila and Wilcox
cases with Blond v. United States were simultaneously considered by the
court for the purpose of disposing of defendant's motions for summary judg-
ment pending in each case. The Wilcox and Blond cases, in which defendant's
motions were denied, in the opinion of the court, raised an issue of fact as
to whether each of the servicemen therein was acting in line of duty at the
time of his respective death. In the PanelZa case, however, the plaintiff was
an inmate of the United States Public Health Service Hospital at Lexington,
Kentucky, who sued for damages because of injuries sustained when he was
set upon and stabbed by another inmate of the facility. This plaintiff alleged
negligence of the defendant in failing to provide sufficient guards to assure
proper supervision and control in the locked room in which the injury
occurred. Plaintiff was patient at the hospital who had selected treatment at
the facility in lieu of twelve months incarceration or probation after convic-
tion as a user of narcotics by the Kentucky state court.
137. See note 131 supra.
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generis."8s It also rejected the plaintiff's connotation of the statutory
term "wrongful" as expanding the normal concept of negligence as
limited by the law.139 It found absurd a construction of these two
exceptions which would exculpate the Government for assaults by
its own employees, who were under its direct supervision and control,
and make it liable for like acts on the part of third persons not subject
to such close supervision and control. It finally pointed out that Con-
gress could have provided, had it desired such limitation, a provision
reading "assault or battery by an employee of the government," instead
of the more sweeping language of the existing exception.140 This
decision like that in the Jones case, essentially represents the appli-
cation of federal common-law rules of tort,141 necessary for the
achievement of a uniform standard in a field where sovereign im-
munity still prevails.
Although many of the cases treated in this paper may, upon first
impression, indicate a questionable departure from the commonly
accepted law of the place standard prescribed by the Act, careful
analysis will, however, reveal that such necessary application of a
federal common-law rule best serves the basic purpose of a conflict-
of-laws doctrine-assurance of uniformity of treatment, regardless
of the adventitious circumstances determining the forum.
42
138. See note 135 supra. Cf. Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 56 Sup. Ct.
395, 80 L. Ed. 522 (1936); United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 52 Sup. Ct. 65,
76 L. Ed. 224 (1931).
139. In this respect, the court was proceeding upon sound principles of
statutory construction. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 45, 46, 73 Sup.
Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427 (1953).
140. Such conclusion finds support in strict construction of sovereign waivers
of immunity. See note 64 supra.
141. Cf. Paige v. State, 269 N.Y. 352, 199 N.E. 617 (1936) (state held liable
for injuries to an inmate of a private correctional institution subject to state
inspection and supervision). And see Moos v. United States, 22 U.S.L. WFEK
2334 (U.S.D. Minn. Jan. 15, 1954), 7 VAND. L. REv. 283 (assault and battery ex-
ception of Section 2680 (h) applied to negligence of VA hospital which operated
on the veteran's right instead of his injured left leg; a broad construction was
given to the statutory terms equivalent to and beyond that permissible under
state law).
142. Cf. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 583, 591, 73 Sup. Ct. 921, 97 L.
Ed. 1254 (1953).
